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Abstract—This paper addresses recent experimental measure-
ments from an IEEE 802.11 ad hoc network testbed, which indi-
cate a strong signal strength dependence in the ability of a hidden
terminal to gain access to the radio channel. We presentanalytical
results investigating the ‘hidden terminal jamming’ ability of the
IEEE 802.11 DSSS physical layer. Results indicate that in a hid-
den terminal topology, the presence of an interfering transmission
with a signal strength marginally greater than the transmission
currently being received will result in an intolerable increase in
BER, effectively jamming the ongoing transmission. These results
conﬁrm previous experimental measurements which show that af-
ter a number of MAC layer timeout/retransmission periods, the
original (weaker) connection is effectively prevented from gaining
access to the channel.
I. INTRODUCTION
The continued desire for mobile, ‘anywhere, anytime’ net-
working has contributed greatly to the current interest in Mo-
bile Ad Hoc Networks (MANET’s). The dynamic nature of a
MANET is such that hidden terminal scenario is likely to be
common. Therefore, a MAC protocol capable of overcoming
this problem needs to be employed. The IEEE 802.11 MAC
protocol potentially represents a good solution for MANET’s,
having been implemented by many manufacturers, and also
including the Request-To-Send / Clear-To-Send (RTS/CTS)
handshaketo provideMAC layer protectionagainst hiddenter-
minal collisions.
However, recent experimental measurements [1] have indi-
cated that the IEEE 802.11 [2], [3] medium access control and
physical layer protocols may be inherently susceptible to hid-
den terminal induced channel capture. We deﬁne ‘hidden ter-
minal jamming’ as the phenomena where transmissions from a
hidden transmitter using a spreading code within the available
sequence set can effectively jam an ongoing hidden transmis-
sion. We investigate the hidden terminal jamming capability of
802.11inanidenticalscenariotothatemployedexperimentally
in [1], in an effort to explain these results.
In this paper we use previous results [4], [5] for a Binary
PhaseShiftKeying(BPSK)modulatedDirectSequenceSpread
Spectrum(DSSS)signaltoinvestigatetheimpactaninterfering
transmission has on the Bit Error Rate (BER) experienced by
an existing transmission for the 802.11 DSSS physical layer.
Our results indicate that the DSSS physical layer is susceptible
to jamming when hidden terminals are competing for channel
access.
IEEE 802.11 Distributed Coordinate Function (DCF) com-
pliant modems employed in a hidden terminal ad hoc mode
have illustrated a strong signal power dependence on the abil-
ity of contending hidden connections to gain access to a radio
channel [1], despite the RTS/CTS handshake. Measurements
indicate that a difference of
<
5 dB was sufﬁcient to prevent
a weaker host from accessing the channel, while the stronger
host was able to achieve reliable, consistent throughput. In
the case where signal levels were equal, the channel was effec-
tively shared using the RTS/CTS handshake. This is contrary
to expectation, as with this handshake we anticipate a reason-
ably fair distribution of channel access relatively independent
(within reason) of the signal strength of either receiver partic-
ularly given the capture ability of the radio modem providing
some immunity to an external noise signal.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: in Sec-
tion II we review details of the 802.11DSSS physicallayers, in
SectionIIIwe presentouranalysisofthe experimentalscenario
employed in [1], with numerical results following in Section
IV. Section V concludes the paper.
II. IEEE 802.11
The original IEEE 802.11 standard [2] deﬁnes a Medium
Access (MAC) Protocol, and three distinct physical layers: an
Infra-Red physical layer (IR), and two spread spectrum layers,
one based on Frequency Hopping Spread Spectrum (FHSS),
and another using Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS).
The 802.11 standard was updated [3] with the addition of the
High Rate (HR) physical layer extensions. This allowed the
DSSS physical layer to operateat 5.5 Mbit/sec and 11 Mbit/sec
in addition to the original 1 and 2 Mbit/sec.
At the MAC layer, the Distributed Co-ordinate Function
(DCF) implementsCSMA/CA, with an RTS-CTS-DATA-ACK
handshake. This scheme is able to operate in a peer-to-peer ad
hoc mode, being a fully distributed MAC protocol. There is
also an optional Point Co-ordinate Function (PCF) which im-
plements a polling scheme, controlledby a central base station.
This approach may potentially operate quite well with hidden
terminals, though currently is unable to be employed in an ad
hoc mode. The analysis in this paper will concentrate on the
self jamming ability of the DSSS physical layer, therefore we
brieﬂy review the properties of both the Basic and High Rate
DSSS.TABLE I
802.11DSSS MODULATIONTECHNIQUES AND SPREADINGCODES
Bit Rate Coding Modulation Bits per
(MBit/s) Scheme Technique Symbol
1 Barker Sequence (11 Chip) DBPSK 1
2 Barker Sequence (11 Chip) DQPSK 2
5.5 CCK or optional BCC DQPSK 4
11 CCK or optional BCC QPSK 8
A. Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum Physical Layer
The DSSS physical layer for 802.11 provides 4 different bit
rates. As illustrated in Table I, each of the 4 data rates employ
a different combinationof modulationtechnique and spreading
code to achieve the desired symbol rate, and number of bits per
symbol. The Basic Rate (BR) comprises the 1 and 2 Mbit/s
data rates, and employs a Barker spreading code with DBPSK
or DQPSK respectively. The common 11 chip code used by all
stations for both the 1 and 2 Mbit/sec physical layers is
+1,-1,+1,+1,-1,+1,+1,+1,-1,-1,-1
The HR-DSSS physical layer, comprising the 5.5 and
11 Mbit/s rates, employs Complementary Code Keying
(CCK) with a spreading code of length 8, generated
by a generalised Haddamard transform (1) where
￿
1 is
added to all code chips,
￿
2 to all odd code chips,
￿
3
to all odd pairs, and
￿
4 to all odd quads of code
chips. In each case, the chipping rate is 11 Mchip/sec.
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This leads to a family of 16 distinct spreadingsequences which
are used to indicate the symbol transferred.
For CCK 11 Mbit/sec modulation (at 8 bits/symbol),
￿
1 is
again encoded by
d
0 and
d
1 using DQPSK. Data bits (
d
2
;
d
3),
(
d
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;
d
5),and (
d
6
;
d
7) are used to QPSK encode
￿
2,
￿
3, and
￿
4
respectively, as shown in Table II
This leads to a matrix of 256 potential spreading sequences
supporting the transmission of 8 bits per symbol.
III. ERROR PROBABILITY OF RECEIVED FRAME
The results presented in [1] illustrate a distinct relationship
between the ability of a host to capture the radio channel, and
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the signal strength of each contending frame measured at the
receiver. This is a problem speciﬁc to the hidden terminal
topology, where the standard CSMA/CA access mechanism is
unable to sense a transmission that may result in a collision at
the intended receiver. A successful transmission relies on the
reception of an RTS frame by the intended receiver.
Referring to Fig. 1, when hidden terminals are attempting to
communicate with a common receiver, we consider two possi-
ble collisions which may occur at the receiver:
1. an RTS frame from connection A collides with a DATA
frame from connection B
2. an RTS frame from connection A collides with an RTS cur-
rently under reception from connection B
In each case the eventual behaviour will be dependenton many
additional factors, includingthe timing of the interfering frame
arrival, and the relative signal power of both transmissions. In
case 1 the contention will be handled by the MAC protocol.
However, the measurements in [1] show that the stronger host
will able to capture the channel after a number of backoff pe-
riods. Even though the RTS frame is relatively small, 40 bytes
compared to several hundred for the data frame, there is a high
probability that the data frame will be corrupted by the colli-
sion if the signal energy is sufﬁciently high. This then provides
an opportunity for the stronger host to prevent a weaker host
from gaining access to the channel through a number of time-
out and retransmission cycles. This case is further complicated
by the fact that all control messaging (RTS/CTS etc.) are trans-
mitted at the highest common transmission rate supported by
all known nodes in the network. Thus there is the potential for
a transmissionspreadusing the Barkersequenceto collidewith
a data frame spread using the CCK codes generated with (1).
In case 2, the receiver will either retain capture of the orig-
inal RTS frame and return a valid CTS, or will loose both of
the frames, unable to respond with a CTS until an RTS is cor-
rectly received. The experimentalresults in [1] suggest that the
stronger host will win this contention period, and be able to
capture the channel.
Host 2
Host 3 Host 1
Connection A Connection B
Fig. 1. Experimental TopologyTo examine the impact of an interfering transmission on the
reception of a previously acquired frame, we have investigated
the resulting BER obtainedat the outputof a correlationspread
spectrum receiver. The model assumes that the initial frame,
y,
is currently being received, at
T
>
T
a, where
T
a is the time
required by the correlation receiver to acquire and achieve syn-
chronisation with the signal, the acquisition time. An asyn-
chronous interfering frame,
x, arrives at a time
T
2
>
T
a.F o r
both the BR-DSSS and HR-DSSS physical layers, we deter-
minethe impactthis has onthe correlationreceiveroutputBER
as a function of the relative power difference between the sig-
nals, and hence the ability of the receiver to maintain capture
of the initial frame.
Our analysis for the DSSS physical layer is based on re-
sults in [4]. The original result for the SNR experienced by
the
yth user, at the correlator output of a BPSK asynchronous
DS-CDMA receiver is given by
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where
K is the total number of concurrent transmissions re-
ceived (including the
yth frame whose BER we are investigat-
ing),
N
o the one sided noise power spectral density,
E
b
1 the
bit energy of the
yth frame,
N the sequence length, and
r
x
;
y
is the Average Interference Parameter (AIP). The AIP can be
approximated [6] as
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We deﬁne the relative signal strength between the contending
frames as
Æ
x
=
E
b
x
E
b
y
(8)
where
E
b
x and
E
b
y are the respective signal bit energies for
each frame. If we assume that the interferring frame
x arrives
with a signal power
Æ
x times greater than the current frame
y,
(5) can be written as
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The BER is then expressed as
B
E
R
y
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Q
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y
) (10)
where Q is the complementary error function.
A. DSSS Basic Rate Physical Layer
The use of a single spreading code for the both basic rates
allows us to simplify (9). The aperiodic cross correlation
C
X
Y
is replacedbythe autocorrelationfunction,
C
X
X forthe Barker
sequence employed. Combined with the approximation de-
rived in [6], the ﬁnal SNR expression reduces to
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where
￿
=
4
8
0
:
3. This analysis assumes BPSK modulation.
The BR-DSSS PHYS employs DBPSK for the 1 Mbit/s rate,
and DQPSK for the 2 Mbit/s rate. A practical system employ-
ing differential modulationwill require even higher SNR at the
receiver to achieve equivalent BER performance [7].
B. DSSS High Rate Physical Layer
Spreading codes for the high rate physical layer are gener-
ated using (1) resulting in 16 complex codes for the 5.5 Mbit/s
rate at to 4 bits per symbol,and 256distinct complexspreading
codes for the 11 Mbit/s rate at 8 bits per symbol. For each rate,
we use (5) to generate an expression for the output BER.
If we again use the ratio of bit energies for the current and
interfering frame,
Æ
x, and the approximations of the previous
section, we can use (9) to determinethe SNR for the
yth frame,
averagingthis resultacrossall sequencesintheset to determine
the average probability of error.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
A. Single Interferer
This scenario corresponds to Host 1 in Fig. 1 attempting
to send an RTS or DATA frame to Host 2, who is currently
involved in the reception of a frame from Host 3. The BER
given by (10),(11), and (5) has been calculated for a range of
E
b
1
=
N
o values, as a function of
Æ. In each of Fig. 2, 3, and
4 it is evident that the presence of the single interfering frame
from Host 1 has a detrimental impact on the BER of the frame
currently being received from Host 2.
The results for the BR-DSSS 1 and 2 Mbit/s rates are shown
in Fig. 2. With
Æ
=
0 dB, the interfering frame arrives with
a signal power equal to the current frame. At higher
E
b
1
=
N
o
the presence of the interfering transmission will increase the
BER of the initial frame, but will still allow a high probability
of successful reception of the initial frame. In this case, both
connections will have an equal impact on the other, provid-
ing the MAC protocol with a relatively fair scenario to operate.
This result provides a strong basis for the fair channel accessreported in [1] in the case where each connection had an equal
SNR measured at the receiving host.
With
Æ
=
5dB, the presence of the interfering frame raises
the BER to
￿
1
0
￿
1
:
5, signiﬁcantly reducing the probability of
successful reception of the initial frame. Again, this explains
the results in [1] where a 5dB difference in signal power on
the ‘stronger’ link is sufﬁcient to prevent the weaker host from
obtaining access to the channel.
It is also possible to view the curves in reverse. If an in-
terfering frame arrives with
Æ
<
0 dB, then the current frame
will suffer little increase in BER and retain a high probability
of successful reception.
The calculations for the HR-DSSS were performed by av-
eraging the SNR as given by (5) across the entire number of
sequences in the set. This requires the calculation of the in-
terference parameter,
r
x
;
y for each sequence in the set. In this
case, the ‘x’ sequence corresponds to the sequence currently
beingreceived,and the ‘y’sequencethe interferer. Thenumber
of codes in the set represents the number of interfering trans-
missions across which the result must be averaged.
For the 5.5 Mbit high rate sequence set shown in Fig. 3 the
BER follows very closely that of the single barker sequence
employed by the BR-DSSS. In the case of the 11 Mbit/s rate
(Fig. 4) the BER impact is marginally worse, being approxi-
mately
1
0
￿
0
:
5 higher than for the BR-DSSS at
Æ
=
0dB. This
difference is relatively insigniﬁcant, as in either case, the pres-
ence of an interfering frame with
Æ
>
0 dB will, with a high
probability, corrupt the current transmission.
B. Multiple Interferers
Fig. 5 illustrates the impact multiple interferers have on the
average BER for the BR-DSSS 1 and 2 Mbit/s rates. As the
number of interfering frames is increased, the average BER is
increased signiﬁcantly.
Fig. 6 illustrates this for 11 Mbit/s with
E
b
=
N
o
=
2
0 dB.
Again, as the number of interferers is increased, the BER is
signiﬁcantly increased. In practice, a single interferer with
d
e
l
t
a
>
2 dB will be sufﬁcient to jam a competing hidden
transmission.
These results indicate that a host may be unable to success-
fully access the radio channel when competing with a hidden
terminal having a marginally higher signal strength. Transmis-
sions from any terminal are potentially jammed by the stronger
connection, making the RTS/CTS handshake effective for the
strongest host only.
As stated earlier, this analysis is based on the assumption of
a BPSK modulated signal. Therefore, the results can be con-
sidered to represent an ideal case, as more complex modula-
tion schemes require a higher signal strength at the receiver to
achieve an equal BER. Given this analysis indicates quite con-
clusively that the hidden terminal jamming problem is respon-
sible for the behaviour presented in [1], analysis of differential
and quadrature modulation schemes are not considered neces-
sary.
The results presented here illustrate that an interferingframe
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with a higher signal strength, arising from a hidden terminal
has the potential to effectively jam the reception of a prior
frame. This phenomena is particularly likely in mobile ad hoc
networks, where hidden terminals can be expected to be com-
mon.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have presented analytical and numerical re-
sults describing the hidden terminal jamming problem present
in IEEE 802.11 ad hoc networks. We have developed spe-
ciﬁc analytical expressions describing the BER of a received
frame for the IEEE 802.11 DSSS physical layers, provid-
ing an explanation for this phenomena. Our results indicate
that a signal differential as small as 2dB is sufﬁcient for the
stronger transmission to effectivelyjam a weaker transmission,
closely matchingexperimentalmeasurements. This rendersthe
RTS/CTS handshake ineffective for all but the connection with
the highest signal strength. Such scenarios are likely for a
hidden terminal topology where the MAC protocol relies on
the RTS/CTS handshake to prevent hidden terminal collisions.
This leads to the conclusion that improvements are required in
thecurrentIEEE802.11physicallayertopreventsuchmultiple
access interference if it is to be used reliably in future ad hoc
network applications.
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